As per the Joint Statement announced on July 18, 2005, President Bush said he would “work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India” and “would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and policies”. On India’s part, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh conveyed that India “would take on the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States”. As per the Joint Statement, “These responsibilities and practices consist of:

Identifying and separating civil and nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilian facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ·
Taking a decision to voluntarily place its civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. ·
Continuing India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and ·
Working with the United States for the conclusion of a Multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty.

Arguments Against

The deal is likely to abet the nuclear weapon capabilities of India. For, if civil and military facilities are separated, the supply of international nuclear fuel will free its existing facilities, designated as military facilities, to produce plutonium and enriched plutonium exclusively for weapons’ purpose.

The deal might provoke other nuclear weapon states like China to enter into the same kind of agreement with other implicit nuclear nations like Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan President Musharraf, during his recent visit to China, has argued for a Pakistan-China nuclear deal along the same lines.

India has still not signed the NPT treaty. But it will enjoy all the privileges available to declared nuclear powers under the NPT regime. In the eyes of American non-proliferation lobby the nuclear deal is an American sellout to India.

Arguments against the deal in India have centred around three main points. First and foremost, the proposed separation of nuclear facilities into civil and military is costly and difficult or rather impractical due to the Indian nuclear programme being unified since the very beginning. Secondly, the deal will impact India’s ability to produce requisite fissile material as all new nuclear facilities will be civilian in nature and under the supervision of IAEA. Third, nuclear power is costly in nature and an emerging county like India can ill afford it. It is a luxury that only the developed world can enjoy and India should not count on it in its energy security calculus. Last but not the least, the deal is asymmetrical in nature since it is all about American promises and Indian commitments.